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remembering cooperative actions
Tim Winke1,2 and Jeffrey R. Stevens1,3*
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2 Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany, 3 Department of Psychology, 
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Theoretical studies of cooperative behavior have focused on decision strategies, such 
as tit-for-tat, that depend on remembering a partner’s last choices. Yet, an empirical 
study by Stevens et al. (2011) demonstrated that human memory may not meet the 
requirements that needed to use these strategies. When asked to recall the previous 
behavior of simulated partners in a cooperative memory task, participants performed 
poorly, making errors in 10–24% of the trials. However, we do not know the extent to 
which this task taps specialized cognition for cooperation. It may be possible to engage 
participants in more cooperative, strategic thinking, which may improve memory. On 
the other hand, compared with other situations, a cooperative context may already 
engage improved memory via cheater detection mechanisms. This study investigated 
the specificity of memory in cooperative contexts by varying (1) the costs of errors in 
memory by making forgetting defection more costly and (2) whether the recall situation 
is framed as a cooperative or neutral context. Also, we investigated whether variation 
in participants’ social network size could account for individual differences observed 
in memory accuracy. We found that neither including differential costs for misremem-
bering defection nor removing the cooperative context influenced memory accuracy 
for cooperation. Combined, these results suggest that memory accuracy is robust 
to differences in the cooperative context: Adding more strategic components does 
not help accuracy, and removing cooperative components does not hurt accuracy. 
Social network size, however, did correlate with memory accuracy: People with larger 
networks remembered the events better. These findings suggest that cooperative 
memory does not seem to be special compared with other forms of memory, which 
aligns with previous work demonstrating the domain generality of memory. However, 
the demands of interacting in a large social network may require excellent memory. 
Thus, modeling the evolution of cooperation requires an understanding of both the 
social environment in which agents interact and the cognitive capabilities of these 
agents.
Keywords: cooperation, forgetting, memory, prisoner’s dilemma, social network, tit-for-tat
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1. inTrODUcTiOn
Upon entering a bar or restaurant in your home town, you might 
recognize a friend and purchase a drink for him or her. Yet, when 
on a layover in an airport far from home, you likely would not 
join with a stranger and buy a drink for him or her. Why pay 
a cost to help a friend but not a stranger? More generally, why 
do we cooperate in some situations but not others? You would 
likely not continue to cooperate if your friend always expected 
you to pay for his or her drink. Unilateral cooperation allows 
cheating by defectors (those who do not cooperate). In evolution-
ary terms, a population of cooperators would not resist invasion 
from defectors. Therefore, cooperation must be conditional. It 
can be conditional on relatedness to your partner (kin selection: 
Hamilton, 1964), costs imposed on defection (punishment: Boyd 
and Richerson, 1992), observations from other potential partners 
(reputation/indirect reciprocity: Boyd and Richerson, 1989), or 
rates of group fission and extinction (group selection: Traulsen 
and Nowak, 2006).
In the friend/stranger example, cooperation depends on 
the likelihood of your partner reciprocating in the future. Such 
reciprocal altruism or direct reciprocity can allow cooperation to 
evolve because the costs of cooperating can be recouped in the 
future, when your partner cooperates in return (Trivers, 1971). 
The likelihood of a stranger in an airport buying a drink in return 
is much lower than that of a friend in your home town.
The notion of reciprocity has been formalized as a decision 
strategy called tit-for-tat (TFT). The TFT strategy cooperates 
in the first interaction with a partner and, for all subsequent 
interactions, copies the partner’s action in the previous interac-
tion (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). Computer simulations 
have shown that TFT outcompetes other strategies in a repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma, a game that captures the dilemma between 
the selfish advantage of defection and the group advantage of 
cooperation (Axelrod, 1980a). Analytical work has demonstrated 
that TFT is not invadable by always defecting (ALLD) if the 
probability of future encounters is high (Axelrod and Hamilton, 
1981). Therefore, with repeated future interactions, reciprocity 
can maintain cooperation.
1.1. cognitive Building Blocks
TFT has generated a great deal of theoretical and empirical inter-
est because of its simplicity and intuitive nature. It has become 
the default model of direct reciprocity (Nowak, 2006). Though 
being simple and intuitive are desirable characteristics of models, 
they do not necessarily mean that the models represent how 
humans or other animals actually make decisions.
Simon (1955) admonished that understanding decision mak-
ing requires integrating the organism’s cognitive capacities into 
the models. Until recently, researchers had not explored whether 
TFT was cognitively feasible or whether psychological constraints 
may prevent implementing it (Hammerstein, 2003; Stevens and 
Hauser, 2004).
One key cognitive building block for TFT is memory. Because 
TFT strategists copy their partner’s previous action, they must 
store that action in memory. Theoretical work has shown that, 
when TFT strategists forget their partner’s actions and make 
errors in their choices, cooperation degrades into defection 
(Molander, 1985). The detrimental effect of memory errors on 
TFT’s performance has inspired the development of alternative 
strategies that are more robust to memory errors. For instance, 
tit-for-two-tats (TF2T) allow two defections from the partner 
before resorting to retaliatory defection (Axelrod, 1980b). 
Generous tit-for-tat (GTFT) forgives a single defection with a 
certain probability (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992). Contrite tit-for-
tat (CTFT) recognizes its own mistaken defection and corrects 
with cooperation (Boyd and Richerson, 1989).
Despite this theoretical interest in the effect of memory errors 
on reciprocal strategies (Molander, 1985; Stephens et  al., 1995; 
Wu and Axelrod, 1995; Rieskamp and Todd, 2006), the memory 
error rates were not grounded in any kind of empirical data on 
forgetting. To estimate empirical memory error rates, Stevens 
et al. (2011) measured human forgetting rates in a cooperative 
memory task. In this task, participants viewed actions (cooperate 
or not cooperate) chosen by a set of simulated partners. After 
viewing all partners once, they then encountered each partner 
again in a random order, and they were asked to recall whether 
that partner cooperated or not. Then, the partner’s next action 
was presented (each action was randomly chosen with equal 
probability). Participants experienced multiple rounds of these 
encounters with their partners. Stevens et al. (2011) varied the 
number of rounds and the number of partners between par-
ticipants. In the various conditions, participants made errors in 
10–24% of the trials. Moreover, error rates increased with more 
intervening events (number of interactions with other partners 
between two consecutive interactions with a particular partner). 
Computer simulations suggested that these error rates would 
likely preclude the evolution of cooperation (Stevens et al., 2011). 
It is important to highlight that this study aimed to test the cogni-
tive capacities need for TFT specifically rather than cooperation 
generally.
1.2. Domain specificity of cooperative 
Memory
Stevens et al. (2011) provided the first empirical estimates of forget-
ting rates for cooperative events. But they did not address whether 
cooperative memory is “special,” i.e., it remains unclear whether 
cooperative contexts tap specialized, domain-specific cognitive 
mechanisms that have evolved to deal with the important adap-
tive problems of cheater detection (Cosmides and Tooby, 1989). 
Memory, in particular, seems to be adapted to solve key informa-
tion processing problems (Bjork and Bjork, 1988; Anderson and 
Schooler, 1991; Schacter, 1999; Nairne and Pandeirada, 2016). 
For example, work on “survival memory” indicates that people 
have better memory for items when primed to think about fitness-
relevant contexts compared to fitness-irrelevant contexts (Nairne 
et al., 2007; Nairne and Pandeirada, 2016). Some have suggested 
that memory may be enhanced in cooperative situations, as well. 
Early work in this area showed that people had better recogni-
tion memory for cheaters compared with cooperators (Mealey 
et al., 1996). Subsequent work correcting for biases, however, has 
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failed to show better recognition memory for cheaters (Barclay, 
2008; Volstorf et al., 2011; Bell and Buchner, 2012). Yet, people 
do have better source memory for cheaters. Cheaters are better 
remembered when they are smiling or viewed as likeable com-
pared with when they are angry or viewed as unlikeable (Bell 
et al., 2012a). Thus, certain aspects of the decision context (e.g., 
emotional incongruency) can enhance memory for cheaters (Bell 
and Buchner, 2012).
Most work on cooperative memory has focused on whether 
people preferentially remember one action (cooperate or defect) 
or one reputation type (cooperator or defector). Although 
researchers have explored how memory for cooperative reputa-
tion may differ from memory of other emotionally arousing 
reputations (Bell et al., 2012b), we do not know whether memory 
for cooperative events is enhanced relative to memory for other 
events. This study aims to investigate whether Stevens et al. (2011) 
tapped specialized, domain-specific memory abilities for events. 
We investigated this in two ways. First, we explored whether 
cooperative situations enhance memory relative to other, neutral 
situations. Though people remember social information better 
than non-social information (Mesoudi et  al., 2006), it is not 
clear whether they remember cooperative contexts better than 
non-cooperative contexts. We created two memory contexts. One 
context replicated Stevens et al.’s (2011) cooperative memory task, 
where participants had to recall a partner’s cooperation or defec-
tion. The other context simply had participants track whether 
each partner read a newspaper or not each day. Better memory 
performance in the cooperative context would indicate that coop-
erative situations trigger domain-specific memory mechanisms.
Second, we explored whether memory performance in Stevens 
et  al. (2011) was rather poor because the cooperative memory 
task did not properly trigger the relevant cooperative memory 
mechanisms because there was no strategic component to the 
task. To enhance the strategic nature of the task, we varied how 
participants were paid based on whether the correct answer was 
a “positive” action (cooperate or read newspaper) or “negative” 
action (not cooperate or not read newspaper). Our standard 
payoff scheme paid participants 5 cents when they were correct 
and nothing if they were incorrect, replicating Stevens et  al. 
(2011). Our costly payoff scheme (1) provided differential pay-
offs depending on whether the correct answer was positive or 
negative and (2) allowed for losses not just gains. Therefore, in 
the costly payoff scheme, errors are differentially costly, depend-
ing on what is remembered. According to error management 
theory (Haselton and Buss, 2000), people should minimize the 
most costly error. Because forgetting defection (and not reading 
the newspaper) is more costly than forgetting cooperation (and 
reading the newspaper), this mirrors the strategic aspects of the 
prisoner’s dilemma in which cooperating against a defector yields 
the lowest payoff in the game. Therefore, in the cooperative but 
not neutral context, better memory in the costly payoff scheme 
compared to the standard scheme would indicate that adding a 
strategic component is needed to trigger domain-specific coop-
erative memory. If memory is better in the costly compared to 
standard scheme in both the cooperative and neutral contexts, 
this would indicate that the costs of mistakes drive performance, 
not strategic cooperation.
1.3. Memory and social networks
A key finding from Stevens et al. (2011) is that memory perfor-
mance decreased with larger groups of simulated partners. That 
study, however, used the group’s sizes of only 5–15 individuals, 
much smaller than the estimated sizes of actual social networks 
(Hill and Dunbar, 2003). The social brain or social intelligence 
hypothesis predicts that cognitive abilities should reflect the 
level of social complexity experienced by individuals (Jolly, 1966; 
Humphrey, 1976; Byrne and Whiten, 1988; Dunbar, 1992). This 
is typically evaluated by correlating traits across species. For 
example, Dunbar (1992) showed that primate species that live in 
larger groups have larger relative brain size (neocortex volume 
relative to rest of brain volume).
Though the social intelligence hypothesis is primarily an evo-
lutionary hypothesis meant to account for species differences in 
cognition, it may also apply to individual differences in cognition. 
This would predict a relationship between an individual’s cogni-
tive abilities and his or her functional social network size. Since 
memory is an important cognitive constraint on cooperation, the 
social intelligence hypothesis predicts that memory performance 
should correlate with social network size across individuals. Stiller 
and Dunbar (2007) found that, in fact, memory accuracy for facts 
did correlate with social network size. We expect this to carry 
over to cooperative memory situations, as well. Those individu-
als who have good memories are able to remember cooperation 
and defection from a larger group of partners. To investigate this 
prediction, we measured social network sizes of our participants 
and correlated them with their memory performance.
1.4. This study
We investigated the domain specificity of cooperative memory 
and the social intelligence hypothesis by using a cooperative 
memory task that replicated the methods of Stevens et al. (2011). 
We varied the context (cooperation/neutral) and payoff scheme 
(standard/costly) to explore the domain specificity of cooperative 
memory. We measured the relationship between memory and 
social network size to explore the social intelligence hypothesis.
2. MaTerials anD MeThODs
We conducted two experiments for this study. The first experi-
ment varied context and payoff scheme. The second experiment 
aimed to replicate only the observed correlation between memory 
and social network size.
2.1. experiment 1
2.1.1. Participants
We recruited 80 participants (39 males and 41 females) with a 
mean ± SD age of 25.8 ± 4.2 (range 18–36) years from German 
Universities via the Max Planck Institute for Human Development 
participant pool from January to February 2011. Due to techni-
cal problems, the sample was restricted to 48 participants (see 
below). Participants earned 5 EUR for showing up plus an aver-
age of 8.88 EUR (approximately 12.16 USD in 2011) per person 
(range  =  1.60–15.55 EUR) based on their performance. This 
project was approved by the Max Planck Institute for Human 
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Development Ethics Commission, and all participants gave 
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki.
2.1.2. Materials and Procedures
This study replicated Stevens et  al. (2011), so the same meth-
ods and descriptions of methods are given here. All materials 
were prepared in German (translated into English here). The 
experiment was programmed in E-prime experimental software 
(Schneider et al., 2002). The first part of the experiment collected 
demographic information from the participants (sex, age, educa-
tional level, occupation, and college major). For the remainder 
of the experiment, participants engaged in a memory task in 
which they viewed simulated partners, and they were asked to 
recall each partner’s previous action (Stevens et al., 2011). Before 
beginning the experiment, participants received a paper copy of 
instructions describing the goal of the task: recall the last action 
for each simulated player (participant instructions are available 
in the Supplementary Material).
A practice phase familiarized participants with the experi-
ment. The practice phase was identical to the actual experimental 
session, except the following: (1) it used fewer trials in a fixed 
order for all participants (three partners with four interactions 
each and six partners with three interactions each), (2) it included 
only female partners (the experimental phases included only 
male partners), and (3) the money earned did not accumulate for 
the final payment. At the end of the practice session, participants 
received feedback concerning their success (“You have accom-
plished the practice session with x out of 21 correct answers.”).
Simulated partners included a photograph of an individual 
and a name (Figure S1 in Supplementary Material). For the 
photographs of partners, we used images from Ebner (2008) 
downloaded from the MPI for Human Development FACES 
Collection (retrieved from http://faces.mpib-berlin.mpg.de on 
21 March 2011). We used 9 images of females for the practice 
phase and 20 images of males for the experimental phase. The 
depicted persons ranged between 18 and 32  years old, with 
the same background and color of clothing (Ebner, 2008). For 
partner names, we used 20 of the most common male German 
names from 1958 to 2000 (retrieved from http://www.gfds.de/
vornamen/beliebteste-vornamen/ on 21 March 2011).
Each session consisted of a series of rounds. Participants 
met with each of 10 partners once in a randomized order per 
round. In the initial round, we presented individually for 
each partner an image, a name, and an action: for instance, 
“Klaus cooperates” or “Ulrich reads the newspaper” (Figure 
S1 in Supplementary Material). We randomly assigned partner 
names and images across participants. Participants viewed 
each partner’s information for 5  s before advancing to the 
next partner (1  s in between partners). For every trial in the 
experimental phase, we randomly assigned the partner’s action 
as cooperate or defect, so participants could not associate a 
pattern of action with each partner and had to track the exact 
behavior of each partner in the previous round. Due to techni-
cal problems, however, partner choices were not completely 
random for 32 participants. Non-random partner choices could 
allow participants to perform better than chance just by using 
the skewed base rates. Therefore, we removed from the analysis 
participants whose mean proportion of choices (aggregated 
across all partners) was lower than 0.4 and higher than 0.6 
for either experimental condition. We chose these boundaries 
(before analyzing the data) because they are reasonably close 
to the truly random value of 0.5. Also, when viewing the data, 
there are natural breakpoints in the distributions at these values 
(Figure S2 in Supplementary Material).
After viewing all members of the group, participants began 
the retrieval rounds, with a randomized order of partners in 
each round. We presented the image of the partners, along with 
the question “What did [name] do last time?” The participant 
had 10 s to answer by pressing buttons on the keyboard. If they 
responded within 10  s, they received a feedback screen for 3  s 
stating whether they were correct, the amount of money they 
received for that trial (only if they were correct), and an updated 
total amount received so far in the experiment. If they failed to 
respond in time, the participant did not receive feedback, only 
a reminder to respond more quickly next time. After the feed-
back screen, participants viewed the new action of the current 
partner for 5 s before advancing to the next partner. In between 
rounds, participants could pause the program and start a new 
round at their discretion. Afterward, participants completed a 
questionnaire asking what kinds of strategies they used to solve 
the memory task, how often they guessed, and how often they 
thought the partners cooperated.
2.1.3. Experimental Conditions
We manipulated two within-subjects experimental conditions 
and one between-subjects experimental condition, leading to a 
2 × 2 × 2 experimental design. The first within-subjects manipu-
lation varied the context experienced by the participant. The 
cooperative context condition replicated Stevens et al. (2011) by 
having partners either cooperate or not cooperate. To introduce 
the idea of cooperation, participants first read the following text:
You are supposed to prepare two-person presentations 
for a high school class together with different partners. 
In the end, you and your partner will receive the same 
mark. Each of your partners can now decide: either he 
will invest time and effort and cooperate or he leaves 
you alone with the preparations and does not cooperate.
The participant then began the practice trials for that condi-
tion, tracking the cooperative actions of their partners. In the 
neutral context condition, rather than tracking cooperation, 
participants tracked a neutral action that involved no strategic 
components. In other words, the partner actions did not 
influence the participant. Before beginning this condition, the 
participants read the following text:
You come in contact with different people. They repeat-
edly decide whether they want to read a newspaper 
this morning over breakfast or not.
All participants experienced 10 rounds of each condition (one 
initial round observing actions and nine recall rounds), with 
TaBle 1 | Payoff schemes.
a. standard payoff condition
Positive action negative action
Correct response 5 cents 5 cents
Incorrect response 0 cents 0 cents
b. costly payoff condition
Correct response 10 cents 5 cents
Incorrect response 0 cents −5 cents
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the order counterbalanced across participants (alternating with 
subject number) and evenly divided between sexes.
The second within-subjects manipulation varied the partner’s 
action. We defined positive actions as cooperating and reading 
the newspaper and negative actions as not cooperating and not 
reading the newspaper. For each trial, the computer program 
randomly chose the positive or negative action with equal prob-
ability. Therefore, we could examine whether the type of partner 
action influenced memory accuracy.
The between-subjects manipulation varied the payoff scheme 
offered to the participants (Table 1). The standard payoff scheme 
was identical to that used in Stevens et al. (2011) in which partici-
pants received 5 euro cents if they answered correctly and 0 euro 
cents if they answered incorrectly, regardless of the correct answer. 
In the costly payoff scheme, the payoffs for correct and incorrect 
answers depended on the correct answer (Table 1). That is, if the 
partner action was positive (cooperate or read the newspaper), 
then the participant received 10 euro cents for correct answers 
and 0 euro cents for incorrect answers. If the partner action was 
negative (not cooperate or not read the newspaper), then cor-
rect answers yielded 5 cents and incorrect answers resulted in 
losing 5 cents. We counterbalanced which condition participants 
experienced (alternating with participant number), and evenly 
divided conditions between sexes.
2.1.4. Questionnaire
After the memory task, participants completed a questionnaire 
in which we asked them whether they knew any of the people in 
the photographs, how often they guessed, what types of strategies 
they used to solve the task, and task motivation. We also asked 
participants how many friends they had in social networking 
websites (such as Facebook) and how many family members, 
close friends, acquaintances, work colleagues, and neighbors they 
had. We summed all of these contacts as our measure of social 
network size. The questionnaire is available in the Supplementary 
Material.
2.2. experiment 2
2.2.1. Participants
Experiment 2 was a replication study in which we focused on 
cooperative memory and social network size. We tested 80 par-
ticipants (30 males, 48 females, and 2 others) with a mean ± SD 
age of 20.4 ±  1.4 (range 19–25) years from the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln Department of Psychology undergraduate 
participant pool in April 2016. Participants earned course credit 
for showing up plus an average of 3.35 USD (range = 2.15–4.65 
USD) per person based on their performance. This project was 
approved by the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Internal Review 
Board (IRB# 20160316008), and all participants gave written 
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
2.2.2. Materials and Procedures
This experiment replicated the methods of Experiment 1 but 
only with the cooperation scenario using the standard payoff 
scheme. Participants experienced 11 interactions with each 
of 10 hypothetical partners. Because this was an American 
population, we used 29 of the most popular male names in the 
U.S. during the 1990s (when the participants were born) from 
the U.S. Social Security Administration (https://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/babynames/ retrieved on 4 April 2016). We also used 29 
images of neutral male faces and 3 images of neutral female faces 
(for practice trials) from the Umeå University Database of Facial 
Expressions (Samuelsson et al., 2012).
2.2.3. Questionnaire
After the memory task, we asked participants about their social 
network. Instead of estimating contacts, Facebook friends, etc., 
we had participants list the initials of everyone with whom they 
had some kind of social contact in the last 30 days (Lewis et al., 
2011). We used this number of contacts as our measure of social 
network size. We then collected demographic data, such as 
gender and age.
2.3. Data analysis
We conducted a binomially distributed generalized linear mixed 
model (GLMM) with memory accuracy as the binary response 
variable (0 for incorrect and 1 for correct). We included context 
(cooperation or neutral) and the partner’s previous action 
(cooperate/read newspaper or defect/did not read newspaper) 
as within-subjects variables and payoff scheme (standard or 
costly) as a between-subjects variable. For between-subjects 
comparisons, we calculated standard 95% confidence intervals; 
for within-subjects comparisons, we calculated within-subjects 
95% confidence intervals (Morey, 2008); and for mixed-effects 
models, we calculated profile likelihood confidence intervals 
for coefficients (Venzon and Moolgavkar, 1988). Confidence 
intervals are presented in brackets after the parameter estimate.
In addition to frequentist statistics, we calculated Bayes fac-
tors (BF) to provide the weight of evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis (Wagenmakers, 2007). 
For example, BF = 10 means that the evidence for the alterna-
tive hypothesis is 10 times stronger than the evidence for the 
null hypothesis. Bayes factors between 0.33 and 3 provide only 
anecdotal evidence, those between 0.1–0.33 and 3–10 provide 
moderate evidence, those between 0.01–0.1 and 10–100 provide 
strong evidence, and those below 0.01 or above 100 provide very 
strong evidence (Wagenmakers et al., in press). Bayes factors asso-
ciated with GLMMs were converted from Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) using BF e
BICnull BICalternative
=
−
2  (Wagenmakers, 2007). 
Alternative models for main effects included only the main effect 
of interest and the random subject effect. Alternative models for 
FigUre 1 | Effect of number of intervening events on memory accuracy. 
Memory accuracy decreased as the number of intervening events increased. 
Data from Stevens et al. (2011) used comparable parameter values as 
Experiments 1 and 2 (10 partners and 10 interactions per partner).
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interactions included the interaction of the two main effects and 
the random subject effect. Null models for main effects included 
only the random subject effect, and null models for interactions 
included the two main effects (without the interaction) and the 
random effect of subject. All other Bayes factors were computed 
using non-informative (Bayesian t-test) or weakly informative 
(Bayesian regression/ANOVA) priors (Rouder et  al., 2009; 
Rouder and Morey, 2012).
We analyzed the data using R Statistical Software version 
3.4.1 (R Core Team, 2017) and the BayesFactor (Morey and 
Rouder, 2015), cowplot (Wilke, 2016), dplyr (Wickham and 
Francois, 2016), ggplot2 (Wickham, 2016), lme4 (Bates et al., 
2015), papaja (Aust and Barth, 2017), plyr (Wickham, 2011), 
and tidyr (Wickham, 2017) packages. Data, R code, and sup-
plementary figures are available in the Supplementary Material 
and at the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/zcv4m/). The 
manuscript was created using rmarkdown (Allaire et al., 2017) 
and knitr (Xie, 2015), and the reproducible research materials 
are available from author JRS and at https://osf.io/zcv4m/.
3. resUlTs
3.1. replication of stevens et al. (2011)
The overall memory accuracies (collapsed across all conditions) 
from Experiment 1 (mean ± SD = 81.2 ± 10.3%) compared with 
those of Stevens et al. (2011) (77.5 ± 10.5%) showed no evidence 
of a difference (mean difference [95% CI] =  3.7% [−1.2, 8.7], 
Cohen’s d = 0.35, BF = 0.64). Experiment 2, however, resulted in 
lower accuracies (67.1 ± 12.2%) than Stevens et al. (2011) (mean 
difference = 10.5% [6.8, 14.1], Cohen’s d = 0.86, BF > 100) and 
Experiment 1 (mean difference =  14.2% [9.1, 19.2], Cohen’s 
d =  1.17, BF >  100). The effect of the number of intervening 
events on memory showed similar decreases (with different 
intercepts) for all data sets (Figure 1). Thus, the data from these 
experiments broadly replicated Stevens et al. (2011).
3.2. Payoff scheme and context
For Experiment 1, we conducted a binomial GLMM using 
memory accuracy as a dependent variable, payoff scheme as a 
between-subjects variable, and context and partner action as 
within-subjects variables. Participants remembered 81.5% [77.3, 
85.6] of the actions in the standard payoff scheme and 80.8% 
[76.4, 85.2] in the costly scheme, providing strong evidence that 
accuracy did not differ between payoff schemes (β = 0.08 [−0.36, 
0.52], BF = 0.01; Figure 2A).
Participants remembered 80.9% [78.2, 83.6] of the actions 
in the cooperation context and 81.4% [78.7, 84.0] in the neutral 
context, providing strong evidence that accuracy did not differ 
across context (β =  0.26 [0.04, 0.47], BF =  0.01; Figure  2B). 
Therefore, participants remembered partner actions equally 
independent of payoff scheme or context.
3.3. Partner action Type
For Experiment 1, participants remembered 79.2% [76.4, 81.9] 
of the partners’ positive actions (cooperate/read newspaper) 
and 83.0% [80.3, 85.7] of their negative actions (defect/did not 
read newspaper), which was very strong evidence for a differ-
ence between the two partner action types (β = 0.51 [0.28, 0.73], 
BF > 100; Figure 3). There was strong evidence for no interac-
tion between partner action type and payoff scheme (β = −0.15 
[−0.47, 0.17], BF =  0.06) and no evidence for an interaction 
between partner action type and context (β = −0.26 [−0.58, 
0.07], BF = 0.56). Therefore, participants remembered defection 
better than cooperation across the two payoff schemes, but they 
also remembered not reading a newspaper better than reading a 
newspaper.
3.4. social network size
For Experiment 1, there was no evidence for memory accuracy 
correlating with social network size (r46  =  0.09, BF  =  0.34); 
however, these data included outliers (Figure  4A). As an 
exploratory analysis, we removed the two data points with high 
Z-scores (greater than 3.5) and high leverage. The trimmed data 
showed moderate evidence for a positive relationship between 
memory accuracy and social network size (r44 = 0.35, BF = 3.20; 
Figure 4B).
The replication study (Experiment 2) tested a different group 
of participants and used an alternative measure of social network 
size that recorded the number of individuals that participants 
encountered in the last 30 days. This confirmatory data set repli-
cated the moderate positive relationship between memory accu-
racy and social network size (r78 = 0.32, BF = 9.17; Figure 4C). 
Note that non-informative priors were used to estimate this 
Bayes factor, so this value is independent of the analysis from 
Experiment 1 (i.e., we did not use the posterior distribution 
from Experiment 1 as the priors for Experiment 2). Therefore, 
individuals with larger social networks remembered better than 
those with smaller networks.
FigUre 3 | Effect of payoff scheme and context on memory accuracy. 
Memory accuracy was higher following a partner’s cooperation than his 
defection for both standard and costly payoff schemes. Data are aggregated 
across both context types. Circles represent means, error bars represent 
within-subjects confidence intervals, horizontal bars represent medians, 
boxes represent interquartile ranges, and whiskers represent full ranges.
FigUre 2 | Effect of payoff scheme and context on memory accuracy. (a) Memory accuracy did not differ between the standard and costly payoff scheme.  
(B) Memory accuracy did not differ between the cooperation and neutral context. Circles represent means, error bars represent between-subjects confidence 
intervals, horizontal bars represent medians, boxes represent interquartile ranges, and whiskers represent full ranges.
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4. DiscUssiOn
Our aims in this study were to (1) replicate findings of Stevens 
et al. (2011), (2) determine whether more strategic payoff situa-
tions induce better memory than standard payoffs, (3) determine 
whether cooperative contexts induce better memory than neutral 
contexts, and (4) assess whether memory accuracy positively cor-
relates with number of social contacts. In general, our findings 
replicated those of Stevens et al. (2011) with memory accuracy 
decreasing with the number of intervening events (Figure  1). 
To investigate whether a more strategic payoff situation induces 
better memory than standard payoffs, we made forgetting defec-
tion costly and correctly remembering cooperation more valuable 
than remembering defection (Table 1). Despite this difference in 
payoffs, participants exhibited the same memory accuracy levels 
(Figure 2A). To investigate whether cooperative contexts induce 
better memory than neutral contexts, we provided contexts 
framed as either cooperative or not cooperative (recalling whether 
a partner read a newspaper). Participants did not differ in their 
memory accuracy levels between the two contexts (Figure 2B). 
Finally, we found that memory accuracy did positively correlate 
with number of social contacts in two experiments (Figure 4). 
Thus, we did not find evidence of cooperative memory being 
special, but we did demonstrate a relationship between coopera-
tive memory and social network size.
4.1. is cooperation special?
A potential criticism of Stevens et al.’s (2011) experiment is that 
the memory task did not engage purported cooperation-specific 
cognition because there was no strategic component. To address 
this, we included a condition with a payoff structure that mir-
rored a prisoner’s dilemma payoff scheme, where the reward for 
correctly remembering cooperation was enhanced and the cost to 
forgetting defection was enhanced such that the participants lost 
money. This created a signal detection problem with differential 
costs for false alarms and misses. If individuals minimize the total 
number of errors committed, there should be no difference between 
the payoff schemes. If individuals maximize expected value, there 
should be no difference between remembering cooperation 
and defection for the standard payoff scheme, but a bias toward 
remembering cooperation in the costly scheme. If individuals are 
minimizing risk (most costly error), there should be no difference 
FigUre 4 | Relationship between number of contacts and memory accuracy. (a) Using all data in Experiment 1, there was no evidence for a relationship between 
number of contacts and memory accuracy. (B) Removing the two outliers showed a moderate positive relationship between number of contacts and memory 
accuracy. (c) Experiment 2 replicated the finding that memory accuracy positively correlated with number of contacts. Gray bands represent point-wise confidence 
intervals.
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between remembering cooperation and defection for the standard 
scheme, but a bias toward remembering defectors in the costly 
scheme. Our results show a bias for remembering defection better 
than cooperation, but it applies to both the standard and costly 
payoff schemes (Figure 3). This contradicts the predictions of sig-
nal detection theory because the payoff schemes differed in their 
costs, which should influence performance. Despite contradicting 
the theories, these results align with many other tests of signal 
detection theory, where participants ignore costs of errors when 
detecting signals among noise (Bohil and Maddox, 2001; Lynn 
and Barrett, 2014).
Signal detection theory does not specify the mechanism by 
which detection thresholds are set; it only provides optimal solu-
tions to detection problems. The assumption, however, is that 
individuals are learning about the probability of the different 
states of the world (in our case, partners cooperating or defecting) 
and the costs and benefits of errors and accurate judgments. 
Thus, within a session, participants should adjust to the prob-
abilities and payoffs. We did not find this when aggregating over 
the entire experimental session. As an exploratory analysis, we 
tested memory accuracy for cooperation and defection for only 
the cooperation context as a function of payoff scheme for the last 
40 trials per condition but found the same results.
Though a learning-based interpretation of signal detection 
theory pre dicts sensitivity to payoffs over the course of an 
experiment, error management theory (Haselton and Buss, 
2000) does not. Rather, error management theory predicts that 
natural selection is the mechanism that sets detection thresholds. 
That is, detection thresholds must have some genetic basis, and 
individuals whose thresholds provide fitness benefits are more 
likely to pass on those genetic predispositions to their offspring. 
Therefore, detection thresholds may not be dynamic under this 
theory. They may be set to values that provide overall benefits. 
The fact that participants remembered defectors better than 
cooperators supports the error management theory prediction of 
thresholds that minimize the most costly error. This result also 
aligns with other work demonstrating preferential memory for 
defectors over cooperation (Buchner et al., 2009). Nevertheless, 
the lack of a difference between the two payoff schemes suggests 
that making the Stevens et al. (2011) experimental situation more 
strategic did not trigger special cognition for remembering 
cooperative situations.
One possible explanation for the failure of the payoff scheme 
to influence memory accuracy is that the original task by Stevens 
et al. (2011) already triggered the cooperation-specific cognitive 
mechanisms, so accuracy was at ceiling for both payoff schemes. 
If this is the case, then we would expect participants to perform 
better in the cooperation context compared to the neutral con-
text. Yet, we found no difference in performance between these 
contexts. Even the effect of better memory of defection appears 
in both cooperative and neutral contexts. This is unexpected 
because there is no a priori reason to remember that someone did 
not read a newspaper better than remembering that they did read 
a newspaper. One possibility is that people remember negative 
events (not cooperating and not reading a newspaper) better than 
positive ones as is observed with words and images (Robinson-
Riegler and Winton, 1996; Ito et al., 1998; Baumeister et al., 2001). 
This negativity bias may apply across domains. Combined with 
the lack of a difference between payoff schemes, these results 
indicate that memory for cooperative events is domain general 
and does not differ from non-cooperative contexts or more 
strategic cooperative situations. This aligns with previous work 
demonstrating the generality of memory beyond cooperation 
(Bell and Buchner, 2010; Bell et al., 2015).
4.2. social network size
We found that individual social network size correlated with 
memory for actions. This corroborates another finding that 
social network size correlated with memory for facts (Stiller 
and Dunbar, 2007). Our results support the social intelligence 
hypothesis that predicts a relationship between cognition and 
social group size. Interestingly, these results also suggest that this 
is not just an evolutionary hypothesis about species differences. 
Our results indicate that this relationship holds across individuals 
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within a species, as well. Further, recent work has explored the 
neural basis for these individual differences and has reported 
correlations between network size and brain region size/density 
(Bickart et al., 2011; Lewis et al., 2011; Kanai et al., 2012; Powell 
et al., 2012), activity (Von Der Heide et al., 2014), and connectiv-
ity (Bickart et al., 2012; Hampton et al., 2016).
The social intelligence hypothesis, however, is agnostic to 
whether group size limits cognition or whether cognition allows 
expansion of group size. Constraints on cognition for an indi-
vidual may limit the social network size in which he or she may 
function. Alternatively, interacting in larger social networks may 
facilitate enhanced cognition. Though the direction of causa-
tion can probably work both ways, there is evidence in rhesus 
macaques that social network size can drive brain size (Sallet et al., 
2011). Researchers experimentally housed macaques in groups of 
different sizes and found that both gray matter and brain region 
connectivity increased with group size. This result has important 
implications for our findings. It implies that, over the course 
of an individual’s lifetime, the exposure to a complicated social 
environment (large social network) can drive changes in brain 
region size and connectivity. These neural enhancements may 
expand cognitive abilities for individuals in large social networks. 
Memory may not be so much of a constraint on social network 
size. Rather, the social environment may actually shape cogni-
tion. Thus, engaging in social interactions with many partners 
may improve memory for cooperative actions.
4.3. limitations and conclusion
One limitation of our method is that the measures of social network 
size involve memory (recalling the number of Facebook friends 
and recalling individual people in their social networks). Thus, to 
some extent, memory is intertwined with our measure of network 
size. More direct measures of network size (e.g., experimenters 
directly viewing Facebook accounts or using experienced-based 
sampling of social networks) can avoid this issue in future work.
In Experiment 1, our technical problems reduced our sample 
size from 80 to 48 participants. Though the smaller sample size 
reduced our power, the sample size was still large enough to 
provide strong evidence supporting the null hypothesis of no 
difference between payoff scheme conditions or contexts. Thus, 
the Bayesian statistics give us confidence to accept the null 
hypotheses of no difference.
We observed differences between our German and American 
populations of participants. The error rates observed in our 
German population matched those of the Stevens et  al. (2011) 
data, which were drawn from a similar German population. 
The American participants exhibited higher error rates than the 
German participants. Nevertheless, even with a lower accuracy 
rate, the American population replicated the positive relationship 
between number of social contacts and memory accuracy.
In terms of the experimental design, like Stevens et al. (2011), 
this study presented hypothetical actions of hypothetical part-
ners. Ideally, participants should be engaged in actual cooperative 
interactions with real partners. Due to the difficulty of simultane-
ously incentivizing both cooperative interactions and accurate 
memory recall, we opted to incentivize only memory recall. To 
make the task more realistic from a strategic perspective, we 
used the costly payoff scheme to mimic a prisoner’s dilemma. 
Nevertheless, including direct cooperative interactions would 
further increase the external validity of these results.
This was a fairly fast-paced memory experiment. Participants 
had 10 s to recall and choose a partner action, 5 s of exposure 
to new partner actions, and 1  s between partners. Of course, 
this interaction rate does not match natural interaction patterns 
that people experience. Decision time, encoding time, and time 
between interactions were greatly accelerated in this experiment. 
Similarly, this experiment lacked key emotional components of 
actual cooperation situations. However, this experiment was not 
designed to test which cognitive and emotional component are 
used in actual cooperative behavior. Rather, this experiment and 
Stevens et al. (2011) were designed to test whether humans have 
the memory abilities to implement tit-for-tat-like strategies. TFT 
is agnostic on the pace of interaction or the presence of emotional 
input. This study in particular aimed to see if the results in Stevens 
et al. (2011) were robust to changes in the cooperative situation, 
by attempting to both enhance and reduce memory for coopera-
tion. Both efforts failed, suggesting that cooperative memory is 
not special. We do not have the memory abilities to implement 
tit-for-tat-like strategies.
Humans do not accurately remember specific cooperative 
actions. We do, however, remember overall partner impressions 
(Volstorf et al., 2011). That is, though we do not track individual 
actions (cooperating or defecting), we do integrate a series of 
actions into an overall impression and remember these impres-
sions (cooperator or defector) over time. We argue that focusing 
on tit-for-tat-like strategies has provided important insights into 
the evolution of cooperation. But these strategies are simply 
not cognitively plausible. We recommend that modeling efforts 
redirect to strategies that more accurately reflect how humans 
and other animals actually process and remember information. 
We advocate a switch from action-based to impression-based 
strategies. These strategies should incorporate not only personal 
experience but also third-party observation of reputation. The 
reputation perspective already has a modeling history (Boyd 
and Richerson, 1989; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Leimar and 
Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004; Roberts, 
2008), and incorporating personal experience impressions could 
provide important insights and yield a parsimonious model of 
cooperation. Critically, this research program takes the psychol-
ogy of the decision maker seriously, satisfying Simon’s (1955) 
notion of bounded rationality. The modeling world has carefully 
investigated how the environment influences cooperation. But to 
truly resolve the puzzle of cooperation, we must understand the 
cognition of the decision makers.
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